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THE OHIO ENTIRETY ESTATE:
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO
ANTICIPATED PROBLEMS
I.

INTRODUCTION

Section 5302.17 of the Ohio Revised Code' provides for the crea-

tion of estates by the entirety in real property by use of a deed in form
prescribed by statute. At the time of its enactment 2 in 1972 this section
was thought to have reversed the nonrecognition of common law sur1.

Sec. 5302.17. Estate by the entireties
A deed conveying any interest in real property to a husband and wife, and in
substance following the form set forth in this section, when duly executed in accordance with Chapter 5301. of the Revised Code, creates an estate by the entireties in the grantees, and upon the death of either, conveys such interest to the
survivor, his or her separate heirs and assigns.
"ESTATE BY THE ENTIRETIES
WITH SURVIVORSHIP DEED
.... (marital status), of .... county ..... for valuable consideration paid,
grant(s), (covenants, if any), to .... and ....
, husband and wife, for their joint
lives, remainder to the survivor of them, whose tax-mailing address is .
the
following real property:
(Description of land or interest therein and encumbrances, reservations, and
exceptions, if any)
Prior Instrument Reference: Volume .....
Page ..... wife (husband) of
the grantor, releases all rights of dower therein.
Witness . . . . hand this . . . . day of . .. ."
(Execution in accordance with Chapter 5301. of the Revised Code)
A husband and wife who are the sole owners of real property as joint tenants
or tenants in common, may create in themselves an estate by the entireties in such
real property, by executing a deed as provided in this section conveying their entire, separate interests in such property to themselves.
A spouse who is the sole owner of any real property may create in himself or
herself and the other spouse an estate by the entireties in such real property, by executing a deed as provided in this section conveying his or her entire interest in
such property to themselves. The provisions of this paragraph shall be applied
retroactively to cover transactions occurring on or after February 9, 1972.
When an estate by the entireties vests in a surviving spouse, the transfer of the
interest of the decedent spouse may be recorded by presenting to the county
auditor, and filing with the county recorder either a certificate of transfer as provided in Section 2113.61 of the Revised Code, or an affidavit or certificate of
death, reciting the names of the spouses, the residence of the surviving spouse, the
date of death of the decedent spouse, and a description of the property. The county recorder shall make index reference to any certificate or affidavit so filed in the
record of deeds.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5302.17 (Page Supp. 1978).
2. The statute was originally enacted by the 109th General Assembly, taking
effect on February 9, 1972. The 110th General Assembly amended the spousal conveyance provisions on November 22, 1973, providing for retroactive application.
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vivorship estates that had prevailed in Ohio's courts for almost one
and one-half centuries. 3 Although the statute has not had the impact
originally supposed,' it is evident that this casual intrusion' by the
legislature in an area of settled law has raised questions not heretofore
addressed by the Ohio judiciary.
This comment will review the principles of concurrent estates as
developed at common law, and exhibit the modifications adopted by
Ohio courts prior to 1972. By a detailed analysis of the statute's construction, two alternative theories on the nature of Ohio's estate by the
entirety will be proposed. Solutions to anticipated problems in the
operation of the statute will then be suggested under each alternative
theory.
II.

A.

A BACKGROUND

The Common Law of ConcurrentEstates.

At common law, ownership of property by two or more persons,
where the possessory interest of each person was coextensive with the
property, constituted a concurrent tenancy. Concurrent tenancies were
6
generally of three kinds: in common, joint, and by the entirety.
The tenancy in common existed when the owners had interests in

undivided shares of a property. Nothing more than unity of possession, the threshold requirement for all concurrent tenancies, was
required.' The cotenants had ownership in several freeholds, independent

of

each

other,

and

there

was

no

survivorshipl

between

3. Sergeant v. Steinberger, 2 Ohio 305 (1826). See text accompanying notes 29-33
infra.
4. It has been suggested that the statute would have "anything but a casual
effect upon those practitioners whose legal fort6 lies in the areas of real property, estate
planning, probate, debtor-creditor, and domestic relations." Magee, Tenancy by the
Entirety: Ohio's New Estate, 2 N. KY. ST. L.F. 69, 70 (1974) (footnote omitted).
Nonetheless, a search of reported decisions in the jurisdiction for the seven years since
enactment reveals no litigation in these areas, nor in any other area involving the
statute.
5. The legislature did not receive the advice of the state conveyancing bar or title
associations prior to enactment. 2 T. MCDERMOTr, OHIO REAL PROPERTY LAW AND
PRACTICE § 8-16E (3d ed. Supp. 1978).
6. 4A R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 599 (1978).
7. 2 W. WALSH, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 118 (1947).
8. Survivorship is the ownership of a property maintained or obtained by a person by virtue of the death of another person having an interest in the property. Survivorship generally takes one of two forms: (1) technical survivorship, developed at
cotnmon law as an implicit attribute of joint and entirety tenancies, see text accompanying notes 11 & 12 infra; or (2) express survivorship as the manifested intention of the
grantor or grantee in property, see text accompanying notes 30-32 infra. In the former
case, it is the estate itself which requires survivorship while, in the latter, survivorship

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol4/iss2/11

1979]

COMMENTS

them. 9 Upon death, a cotenant's interest in his share passed only to his
heirs or devises, and, during tenancy, the power of each cotenant to convey his respective interest in the property was not limited by the existence
of the cotenancy. Conversely, the existence of the cotenancy was not affected by a cotenant's disposition because the acquiring party merely
took the position of his grantor in the cotenancy. Conveyance by all
cotenants to one party, however, or other partition of the property
among the cotenants, would destroy the tenancy in common: in each
case, the resulting ownership would be by one or more persons in
severalty. I0
Joint tenancy existed where the cotenants' interests were identical,
were derived from the same instrument of title, and were created
simultaneously.I 1 Although each joint tenant owned the property in its
undivided whole, each owned subject to the equal rights of the other
joint tenants. The cotenants, therefore, also had interests in undivided
shares and accordingly held per my et per tout. 12
The most significant characteristic of joint tenancy was survivorship between the cotenants.I 3 Where A, B, and C so held a property,
A's ownership in the undivided whole would not pass to his heirs or
devisees upon his death but would be extinguished in favor of the interests of his surviving cotenants, B and C, in the undivided whole.
The estate would merely be freed from A's participation.'" Similarly,
upon B's death, the joint tenancy would terminate and the sole survivor, C, would own the whole in severalty. When C died, the property
would then pass only to his heirs or devisees.
Joint tenancy-was subject to severance by any act which destroyed
a prerequisite unity.' 5 Conveyance inter vivos of a cotenant's interest
obtains regardless of the estate created. In either case, survivorship operates to defeat
the potential interests of the heirs or devisees of the decedent in favor of the immediate
interests of the named survivor.
9.

4 G.

THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY

§ 1793 (repl. 1961). See also 4A R. POWELL, supra note 6, at 602.
10. 4A R. POWELL, supra note 6, at 610; 4 G. THOMPSON, supra note 9, at
§ 1820. In the former case, the shares are merged in the acquiring cotenant; in the latter, the cotenants each acquire their respective shares and surrender their possessory interests coextensive with the whole property.
11. Together with the threshold concurrent tenancy requirement of coextensive
possessory interests, these items constitute the traditional four unities of interest, time,
title, and possession. C. SMITH & R. BOYER, SURVEY OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 56 (2d
ed. 1971).
12. "By the half and by the whole."
13. 4 G. THOMPSON, supra note 9, at § 1779.
14. Id.; 2W. WALSH, supra note 7, at § 115.
15. 4 G. THOMPSON, supra note 9, at §§ 1780-1781; 2 W. WALSH, supra note 7, at

§ 116.
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in jointly held property would destroy the unities of time and title, and
the acquiring party would therefore hold only as a tenant in common
in the property. A partitioning among cotenants would destroy the
unity of possession and result in each owning the divided shares in
severalty. In either case, the survivorship attending joint tenancy
would be destroyed with the joint tenancy.
The tenancy by the entirety was a peculiar form of concurrent
tenancy reserved for husband and wife. The estate's existence, as in
joint tenancy, was dependant upon the four unities of possession,
time, title, and interest, and, to this extent, it was similar to joint
tenancy. Ownership was in the undivided whole of the property and,
upon the death of a cotenant, his interest did not pass to his heirs or
devisees but was extinguished in favor of the surviving cotenant's
whole ownership. Estates by the entirety, however, differed from joint
tenancy in one crucial unity: a husband and wife at common law were
considered one person.", Seisin was per tout et non per my because
there were no separable persons to hold the moieties. Purchase of a
cotenant's interest in joint tenancy, while destroying necessary unities
and thereby working a severance of the joint tenancy, would be effective because the cotenants held conveyable interests in the moieties in
addition to their interests in the undivided whole. But any purchase
from a tenant by the entirety would be ineffective because it destroyed
the other tenant's interest. Only the unified person, husband1" or husband and wife together, could effectively dispose of the property, and
if the husband conveyed alone the purchaser's interest was subject to
the wife's absolute ownership if she survived the husband. Similarly,
creditors of a joint tenant could levy upon that tenant's interest in the
concurrent estate because the tenant's interest was conveyable; but the
interest of a cotenant by the entirety was immune to creditors because
the interest was not conveyable.18
Survivorship in entirety properties also demonstrated a subtle difference in the character of ownership. In joint tenancy, the death of a
cotenant resulted in enlargement of the interests of the surviving
cotenants because the estate was freed from the decedent's interest in
the moieties. But the survivor in an entirety estate gained nothing, having held only the whole before and after the cotenant's death.' 9 Insofar
16. 4A R. POWELL, supra note 6, at 620; 4 G. THOMPSON, supra note 9, at
§ 1784; 2 W. WALSH, supra note 7, at § 121.
17. The common law recognized the husband's seisin jure uxoris of the wife's
freeholds. See note 22 infra.
18. 4 G. THOMPSON, supra note 9, at §§ 1780, 1790; 4A R. POWELL, supra note 6,

at

618, 623.
19.

4 G. THOMPSON, supra note 9, at § 1784; 2W. WALSH, supra note 7, at § 121.
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as ownership of the property was concerned, the death of a tenant by
the entirety merely converted the survivor's estate to one in severalty.
In feudal times, maintenance of tenurial responsibility for incidents
and services in the fewest number of tenants was preferred. Survivorship was an important feature in avoiding the split of responsibility
that accompanied descent."0 Therefore, ambiguous conveyances indicating a concurrent tenancy were construed under a presumption of
joint tenancy. 2 Further, because of the inferior status of the married
woman, and the husband's seisin jure uxoris" of her freeholds, a
presumption of tenancy by the entirety was operative when the
grantees were husband and wife."
B.

The Modern Law of Concurrent Estates.

The modern law recognizes that, with the decline of the tenurial
system, the primary reason for survivorship no longer exists. Equitable
and statutory modifications have arisen to abolish the presumption of
joint tenancy in favor of a preference for tenancy in common. 2 ' In
some jurisdictions, joint tenancy has been abolished altogether, with
survivorship permitted as an appended characteristic of the tenancy in
common only when the grantor expressly manifests that intent."
The artificial unity of the husband and subservient wife in tenancies by the entirety has been particularly thought to be repugnant to
the status of married women in modern law. 2 6 The Married Woman's
Property Acts abolished seisin jure uxoris, 2 and in states where entire-

20. 4 G; THOMPSON, supra note 9, at § 1775; 2W. WALSH, supra note 7, at § 115.
21. 4A R. POWELL, supra note 6, at 1 602.
22. Literally, it is "in right of the wife." As a practical matter, the married
woman did not constitute a legal entity in the eyes of the law. She could not sue or be
sued except through her husband. Management of the wife's properties was vested in
the husband who, while nominally acting only by virtue of the wife's ownership, was
actually permitted to control and dispose of the property at will.
23. 4A R. POWELL, supra note 6, at 622; 4 G. THOMPSON, supra note 9, at
88 1784, 1785. For example, where A, B, and C were grantees in a concurrent tenancy
and A and B were married, without evidence of the grantor intending the contrary, Aand
B held as tenants by the entirety, of an interest equal to C's, in a joint tenancy
with C.
24. See, e.g., Case v. Owen, 139 Ind. 22, 38 N.E. 395 (1894); VA. CODE §§ 55-20,
55-21 (1950); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-1-5 (1953).
25. See, e.g., Dover Coop. Bank v. Tobin's Estate, 86 N.H. 209, 166 A. 247
(1933); Gore v. Gore, 250 Ala. 417, 34 So. 2d 580 (1948); OR. REV. STAT. § 93.180
(1977).
26. 2 T. MCDERMOTT, supra note 5.
27. As adopted in Ohio, the acts did not create new rights for a wife, but eliminated the husband's control over her rights. Smiley v. Smiley, 18 Ohio St. 543 (1869).
See generally 28 0. JUR. 2D Husband and Wife § 21 (1958).
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ty properties have not been abolished outright, the legal rights of the
spouses during tenancy have generally been equalized.2"
In 1826, the Ohio Supreme Court recognized the modern law approach with respect to joint tenancy in Sergeant v. Steinberger.29 In
that case, the operation of a devise to a husband and wife was
challenged by one of the wife's heirs. The wife had predeceased her
husband and, by the time the action was brought, the property had
been willed by the husband to the defendants. They contended that the
original devise "vested [the husband and wife] with an entirety of the
interests, so that neither could separate it without the consent of the
other, and consequently, by the death of the wife, the whole survived
in the husband
"....
30 The court acknowledged that "the joint tenancy of husband and wife varies in many principles from other joint
tenancies." 3" Nonetheless, insofar as the characteristic of survivorship
was an attribute of joint tenancy in any form, the estate would not
exist in Ohio.
The reasons which gave rise to this description of estate in England,
never existed with us. The jus accrescendiis not founded in principles of
natural justice, nor in any reasons of policy applicable to our society or
institutions. But, on the contrary, it is adverse to the understandings,
habits and feelings of the people.32
The original devise was then construed as one of tenancy in common
with distribution of the wife's interest to her heirs upon death. As a
result, the court did not merely adopt the presumption of tenancy in
common, but unequivocally rejected technical survivorship and, a
posteriori, any estate in which such survivorship was an implicit
33
characteristic.
Elimination of technical survivorship was the only effect of the
Sergeant decision. In Lewis v. Baldwin,3" a wife conveyed her holdings
through a trustee to herself and her husband, granting the property

28. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 557.71 (Supp. 1978-1979) (equalizing
each spouse's rights in entirety properties with respect to control, management, rents,
products, income, and profits).
29.

2 Ohio 305 (1826).

30. Id. at 306.
31.

Id. at 307.

32.

Id. at 306.

33.

Although the Sergeant decision recognized in dicta that entirety estates might

be valid for purposes of creditor immunity or limitation of inter vivos conveyance, the
failure of technical survivorship in entirety estates has since been determined. See, e.g.,
Kipp v. Kipp, 101 N.E.2d 782 (Ohio Ct. App. 1950) (per curiam) (rejection with
respect to personalty).
34. 11 Ohio 352 (1842).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol4/iss2/11
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"to them 'jointly, their heirs and assigns, and to the survivor of
them' " It was contended that they held as tenants in common under
the Sergeant rule and upon the wife's death her heirs should have
shared in the distribution. The court implicitly accepted the proposition that the tenancy created could not itself produce survivorship.
Nonetheless, survivorship would result because of the wording of the
deed.
No perpetuity is created by such a grant. He holds title, not upon the
principle of survivorship, as an incident to a joint tenancy, but as grantee
in fee, as survivor, by the operative words of the deed. The entire
estate ... is vested in him and his heirs. This is the effect of the words of
grant, contained in the instrument of conveyance. 36

This had been the extent of judicial development of survivorship
concurrent estates in Ohio prior to 1972. Joint tenancy with technical
survivorship did not exist in the jurisdiction although property might
be held jointly with express provision for survivorship in the granting
instrument. 37 Tenancy by the entirety, as a form of joint tenancy with
technical survivorship, was also not recognized, and where survivorship was expressly intended there was no discernible variation in treatment attributable to the marital status of the owners. Because the
recognition of survivorship itself in concurrent tenancies appears to
have been the only reason for litigating potential joint and entirety
estates, there have been no reported decisions in Ohio concerning the
operation of other common law characteristics of these estates.
III.

THE NATURE OF THE OHIO ESTATE

The Ohio legislature entered the void in 1972 with the enactment of

35. Id. at 354.
36. Id.
37. These conclusions are auestioned in Martin, The Incident of Survivorship in
Ohio, 3 OHIO ST. L.J. 48 (1937). After a review of the line of cases under Sergeant and
Lewis, the author concluded that the ratio decidendi in each instance was not incompatible with the existence of joint or entirety tenancies. The refusal to recognize technical surviorship was "simply another way of stating the view generally held in other states that,
while there is a preference for the tenancy in common as a matter of construction, the
estate of joint tenancy will be recognized where the language of the conveyance clearly indicates an intention to create it." Id. at 59. Nonetheless, Ohio courts continue to reject
common law cotenancies with technical survivorship, see, e.g., Casey v. Gallagher, 1
Ohio St. 2d 42, 58, 227 N.E.2d 801, 813 (1967) (rejecting survivorship in class gift of trust
income as reestablishment of common law survivorship cotenancy), while accepting and:
characterizing express survivorship as an investiture in the survivor rather than a continuation in ownership, see, e.g., In re Evans, 173 Ohio St. 137, 180 N.E.2d 827 (1962);
Curtis v. Pursley, 10 Ohio Misc. 266, 277 N.E.2d 276 (C.P. Clermont County 1967).

Published by eCommons, 1979

UNIVERSITY OF DA YTON LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 4:2

section 5302.17 of the Ohio Revised Code,38 which provides for the
creation of entirety tenancies in the state. It is not altogether clear that
the nominal objective of the legislation was achieved, however,
because of the peculiar draftsmanship involved. A detailed analysis
leads to two alternative conclusions regarding the character of the concurrent tenancy which is created under the statute.
In determining the nature of the estate provided by the legislation it
is inappropriate to begin with an assumption that the common law
tenancy by the entirety has been authorized in the jurisdiction. The
declaration in the title of the section and throughout its text is that the
prescribed deed "creates an estate by the entireties."3 9 Under common
law theory, however, the estate is by the "entirety" because the
spouses are not several persons in ownership; their interest is similarly
singular in the undivided whole of the property. At the threshold,
then, there are indications that the subject estate involves multiple interests. Were it not for use of the term of art "entirety," even in an incorrect form, the indication of such multiple.interests would probably
preclude the existence of a common law tenancy by the entirety.'
Further, the survivorship mechanism detailed in the statute's

preamble, prescribed deed form, and recording provisions, reinforces
the proposition that common law tenancies by the entirety are not the
object of the legislation. The preamble provides that "upon the death
of either [husband or wife, the deed] conveys such interest to the sur-

38. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5302.17 (Page Supp. 1978). See note 1 supra. The
body of the statute is divisible into five parts: a preamble, generally providing for creation of the new estate; a prescribed deed form; a provision for creation of the new
estate in property held by husband and wife in cotenancy; a provision, inserted by
amendment in 1973, for creation of the new estate in property held by only one spouse;
and a provision for recording the occurrence of survivorship upon the death of a
spouse.
39. Id. (emphasis added).
40. 4 G. THOMPSON, supra note 9, at § 1784; 2 W. WALSH, supra note 7, at § 121;
2 T. MCDERMOTT, supra note 5.
41. The title of the bill when passed by the 109th General Assembly indicated that
its purpose was "[tlo amend section 319.54 and to enact section 5302.17 of the Revised
Code to authorize creation of an estate by the entireties." 1971-1972 Ohio Laws 2213
(emphasis added). The 1973 amending bill stated that its purpose was "[tlo amend section 5302.17 of the Revised Code relative to the creation of an estate by the entireties
by a husband or wife." 1973 Ohio Laws 1857 (emphasis added). The title of an act is
given great weight by Ohio courts in ascertaining the act's meaning. See 50 0. JUR. 2D
Statutes §§ 259-262 (1961) and cases cited therein. The problem here is that the title, in
itself, is ambiguous. The Ohio Constitution, however, provides that "[n]o bill shall
contain more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title." OHIO
CONST. art. 2, § 16 (emphasis added). Although there are no Ohio cases directly on
point, the use of the term "entireties" may provide a source of constitutional attack
on the statute's validity.
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vivor ....,,2 The deed itself grants the "remainder to the survivor,'""
and the recording provision operates "[w~hen an estate by
the entireties vests in a surviving spouse . . . . "' These three
characterizations of the survivorship mechanism, arguably inconsistent
among themselves," 5 are not consistent with common law entirety survivorship. At common law, there are no separable interests to convey,
vest, or remain upon a spouse's death because the spouses during
tenancy together hold a single interest in the whole. 6 More importantly, regardless of the interest during tenancy, the estate survives, and
belongs to the surviving spouse, not by conveyance, vesting, or remainder, but by virtue of the title held by the survivor from the time of
the original grant."
What then is the estate created by a section 5302.17 deed? There
are two plausible alternative characterizations. First, it may be that the
entireties designation in the title and text, and the contradictions between common law theory and the survivorship mechanism in the act,
are only illustrative of legislative confusion about the theoretical
characteristics of entirety estates; and that despite the peculiar draftsmanship, the legislature did intend to provide for a modern law entirety estate, at least within the limiting parameters of the Act. If this is
the case, then Ohio courts will be left to construe the operative
characteristics of the estate, choosing between pure common law principles and the modifications adopted in other jurisdictions that
recognize the estate in some form." 8
The second and, in view of the inconsistencies noted, more tenable
alternative is that the entireties designation in the act is an awkward
attempt to limit availability of survivorship to husband and wife.
Under this approach, the intent of the legislature was merely to provide a statutory form of the judicially recognized survivorship deed for
spouses. 9 The Act's requirement that the grantees under deed be hus42.

OHIO REV. CODE ANN.

§ 5302.17 (Page Supp. 1978) (emphasis added).

43. Id. (emphasis added).
44. Id. (emphasis added).
45. Magee, supra note 4, at 82.
46. 4 G. THOMPSON, supra note 9, at § 1784; 2 W. WALSH, supra note 7, at § 121.
47. Palmer v. Treasurer, 222 Mass. 263, 265, 110 N.E. 283, 284 (1915). In addition to these contradictions between common law theory and survivorship under the
act, when originally introduced in the legislature the bill was designated as a "statutory form for joint tenancy with survivorship." BULLETIN, 109th General Assembly
1971-1972.
48. Magee, supra note 4, at 84 n.75 (identifying 25 other jurisdictions recognizing
the entirety tenancy).
49. Lewis v. Baldwin, 11 Ohio 352 (1842). See also In re Hutchison, 120 Ohio St.
542, 166 N.E. 687 (1929) (survivorship in personalty was based on contract rather than
on the operation of an undefined survivorship tenancy).
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band and wife is, in this view, relatively insignificant in determining
the nature of the estate. Indeed, Ohio courts have ignored the
husband-wife relationship in prior rejection of technical survivorship
or acceptance of express survivorship.5 0 According to this second alternative, the estate created is a concurrent tenancy reserved for husband
and wife with express survivorship between them.
IV.

A.

THE OPERATION OF THE OHIO ESTATE

Estate Creation.

At common law, estates by the entirety could be created by will,
deed, or act of the parties;5 1 the estates could be created in realty or
personalty; 2 and they could be created for any interest in such property. 3 Section 5302.17 addresses each of these principles and directly
limits the flexibility in creation that was available at common law
First, section 5302.17 permits creation of the estate by deed alone
and only by deed conforming in substance with that provided by the
statute. It has been suggested by one author that it would not be
logical to recognize that estate when created by deed and to ignore attempts to create it by other means." Another author has commented
that, after a search of treatises and reported decisions, he could
discover no well-founded reasons for prohibiting creation of the entirety estate by will."
If Ohio courts treat the section 5302.17 estate under the express survivorship approach, then the deed form in the act should not be the
only method for its creation. There is no materially distinguishing
feature between the estate under the express survivorship approach and
50. Compare Sergeant v. Steinberger, 2 Ohio 305 (1826), with Lewis v. Baldwin,
11 Ohio 352 (1842). Nonetheless, it may be argued that the statutory requirement of
the spousal relationship indicates, by negative implication, that the legislature disapproves of nonspousal survivorship arrangements. The continued viability of
nonspousal joint and survivorship bank accounts in Ohio, however, opposes this construction of legislative intent. The legislature has not amended the statutes providing
for such accounts, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1107.08, 1151.19 (Page 1968 & Supp.
1978), and the courts have continued to recognize survivorship in them irrespective of
the relationship of the joint owners. Vetter v. Hampton, 54 Ohio St. 2d 227, 375
N.E.2d 804 (1978); Gregory v. Harper, 48 Ohio App. 2d 184, 356 N.E.2d 500 (1975).
On joint and survivorship bank accounts in Ohio generally, see Note, Joint Bank Accounts with Rights of Survivorship: A Conceptual Maze, 6 CAP. U.L. REV. 477,
482-88 (1977).
51.

C. SMITH & R. BOYER, supra note 11, at 61, 65.

52. 4 G. THOMPSON, supra note 9, at § 1788.
53. 4 G. THOMPSON, supra note 9, at § 1784.
54. Baker, The New Ohio Estate by the Entireties-A Medieval Pandora'sBox
Opened, 45 OHIO B. 1663, 1666 (1972).
55. Magee, supra note 4, at 84-85.
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a survivorship tenancy in common by devise. The creation of cotenancies with expressly intended survivorship between the cotenants has
generally been permitted in the jurisdiction irrespective of the instrument by which it is manifested. 6 In essence, the statute addresses creation of survivorship estates only by deed and should not affect a
court's willingness to recognize intended survivorship not embodied in
a deed. If courts characterize the estate as one in the entirety, however,
then the opposite result should occur. Permitting an entirety estate
outside of the limiting parameters of the act would necessarily be
development at common law. The courts will still face the rule of
Sergeant v. Steinberger" in approaching this development. The
dispositive issue, then, would be whether the enactment of section
5302.17 indicates a legislative intent to abrogate the Sergeant rationale.
Because section 5302.17 does not imply a legislative judgement that all
technical survivorship estates are consistent with modern institutions,
expansion of the estate beyond the statutory limits would probably not
be justified.
Second, section 5302.17 provides for creation of the estate only in
real property. The common law entirety could also be held in personalty. Jurisdictions currently recognizing the entirety estate in some
form are split over its application to personal property. In some cases,
the estate is not limited;5 8 in others, the estate exists only in the proceeds of realty held by the entirety;" in others, there is no entirety
estate in personalty and the proceeds from realty held by the entirety
6
are held in common. 0
Under the first alternative characterization of the Ohio estate, it is
again clear that personalty may not be held by the entirety under the
statute. The expansion of the estate beyond the limitations of the
statute would unjustifiably abrogate the continued viability of the
Sergeant v. Steinberger rationale. 6 ' The difficulty of this approach is
56. Because words of survivorship in a devise to two or more persons are presumed in Ohio to refer to the devisees surviving at the time of the testator's death, see,
e.g., Sinton v. Boyd, 19 Ohio St. 30 (1869); Renner v. Williams, 71 Ohio St. 340, 73
N.E. 221 (1905), clear manifestation of an intent to have the devisees take and hold
with survivorship between them is rare. It is, however, a question of the adequacy of
the manifestation of intent and not of the acceptability of the result. Cf. Taylor v.
Foster, 17 Ohio St. 166 (1867) (devise with survivorship contingent on a devisee's death
without issue); Casey v. Gallagher, 11 Ohio St. 2d 42, 227 N.E.2d 801 (1967) (devise
with implied plan of survivorship in trust income).
57. 2 Ohio 305 (1826). See text accompanying notes 29-33 supra.
58. 4 G. THOMPSON, supra note 9, at § 1788.
59. See, e.g., Ronan v. Ronan, 339 Mass. 460, 159 N.E.2d 653 (1959).
60. See, e.g., Wilson v. Ervin, 227 N.C. 396, 42 S.E.2d 468 (1947).
61. See note 57 and accompanying text supra.
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the treatment of the proceeds of realty held by the entirety, such as are
received upon joint sale or in conversion by eminent domain. This
obstacle can be overcome, however, by recognizing that if the estate
does not exist for personalty, but conversion from realty to personalty
does not destroy cotenancy, then the proceeds must be held by tenancy
in common.6 2 If Ohio courts treat the section 5302.17 estate under the
express survivorship alternative, then, as in dealing with instruments of
creation, no judicial development will be required to extend the estate
survivorship has been permitted in the jurisdicto personalty. Express
3
personalty.'
for
tion
Finally, section 5302.17 appears to agree with the common law
principles by providing, in the preamble, for the estate in "any interest
in real property." 6 The provisions relating to creation of the estate out
of one or both spouses' current holdings, however, require that the
conveying spouse or spouses be "the sole owners of real property . . .,,6 Hence, if A and B are husband and wife, and if A or B
are tenants in common in property with C, then A and B are precluded
from granting the statutory estate to themselves. This anomaly is probably unintentional and it has been suggested that the spousal conveyance provisions in the statute be amended to provide that spouses
who are "the sole owner[s] of any interest in real property ... " may
create the estate.6
If Ohio courts adopt the first alternative of entirety under the
statute, the suggested amendment should not be required. The only
purpose of the provisions is to avoid the circuitous conveyancing that
was required at common law in order for spouses to create the entirety
estate. They merely circumvent the objection that one spouse cannot
create the estate for both spouses in that spouse's property because the
prior holding of that spouse would preclude the unities of time and
62. This conclusion merely characterizes the underlying estate. The survivorship
attending entireties will not be implicitly found in the resulting tenancy in common
because that estate is incapable of producing survivorship. The express survivorship
embodied in the statutory entirety deed form, however, might also be found in the tenancy in common in proceeds. In view of the legislative recognition of joint and survivorship bank accounts, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1107.08, 1151.19 (Page 1968 &
Supp. 1978), a presumption to this effect would not be inconsistent with the limits of
title to personalty in Ohio. Cf. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 557.81 (1967) (provides for
survivorship in notes or other obligations secured by mortgage upon sale of land held
by entirety).
63. See, e.g., In re Hutchison, 120 Ohio St. 542, 166 N.E. 687 (1929); Berberick
v. Courtade, 137 Ohio St. 297, 28 N.E.2d 636 (1940); In re Hatch, 154 Ohio St. 149, 93
N.E.2d 585 (1950).
64. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5302.17 (Page Supp. 1978).

65. Id.
66.

Magee, supra note 4, at 84.
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title in the estate created. 6 As such, the spousal conveyance provisions
are not intended to be restrictive. They should be read in conjunction
with the broader language of the preamble and not prevent the creation of an entirety estate from a tenancy in common interest held with
a nonspouse. If Ohio courts adopt the express survivorship approach
to the section 5302.17 estate, then the anomalous provisions should
also not prevent its creation from a cotenancy held with a stranger.
Because a tenancy in common interest is conveyable, a spouse having
such interest is not prohibited from conveying it to himself and the
other spouse. 68 The attachment of an express survivorship provision to
the conveyance should have no effect on the validity of the conveyance
or the estate created.
B.

CharacteristicsDuring Marriage.

The nature of individual spousal interests under the Ohio estate,
and the rights of creditors in those interests, present various problems
under either alternative characterization. At common law, entirety
cotenants held as a single unit with a single interest. Because conveyance by one spouse would necessarily affect the whole interest in
which the other spouse participated such conveyance was impermissible. If a sole spouse had no coveyable interest then no interest
69
existed for attachment by that spouse's creditors.
67. See, e.g., Stuehm v. Mikulski, 139 Neb. 374, 297 N.W. 595 (1941) (retaining
the common law requirement for an intervening grantee); Milliken v. First Nat'l Bank,
290 A.2d 889 (Me. 1972) (abolishing the requirement); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 565.49 (1967) (giving effect to all conveyances as if grantor was not among named
grantees). The "straw man" technique, of granting to a stranger for reconveyance to
the original grantor and his cotenant, has not been necessary in this context in Ohio
because of the nonrecognition of joint and entirety tenancies in realty. See, e.g.,
Cleaver v. Long, 126 N.E.2d 479 (C.P. Licking County, Ohio, 1955) (estate created
was not defined but survivorship was permitted when spouses manifested that intent by
deed of property to themselves). To the extent that joint and survivorship bank accounts parallel joint tenancy in personalty, see In re Kirkham, 21 Ohio Op. 342 (P. Ct.
1941) (application and analysis of common law joint tenancy principles in a survivorship account), the "straw man" would appear necessary. Failure to use the technique,
however, has not resulted in voided account contracts. See, e.g., Shipman v. Hance,
109 Ohio App. 321, 165 N.E.2d 678 (1959).
68. There are no Ohio cases directly on point. The problem is that a conveyance
to one's self is not generally recognized and that, despite such conveyance, the grantor
who attempts to convey to himself continues in his original title. Nonetheless, it is
generally accepted that a conveyance to one's self and another creates a tenancy in
common. The unity of time is not required. See generally cases collected in 44
A.L.R.2d 595 (1955).
69. This is the rule adopted by the majority of jurisdictions recognizing the common law entirety estate. See, e.g., Baker v. Cailor, 206 Ind. 440, 186 N.E. 769 (1933).
Where the spouses are jointly liable as debtors, however, it follows that the entirety
tenancy, as a jointly conveyable asset, may be employed in satisfaction of the debt.
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The rule of immunity, however, operated as a practical matter only
against the wife's creditors. Creditors of the husband could reach his
entirety properties and attach the present possessory interest of both
spouses.7" This was a logical corrolary of the preemptive right of the
husband, recognized at common law, in control of the wife's freeholds
and their use for credit. Massachusetts, which is the only state retaining the entirety estate with this characteristic has relied on the continued viability of seisin jure uxoris in that jurisdiction to explain the
result. I'
If Ohio courts treat the section 5302.17 estate as one in the entirety, then it will probably be immune from the creditors of either individual spouse. This would be consistent with the single interest concept of common law entirety theory. To the extent that preferential
treatment of the husband's creditors has been justified by his control
over his wife's property interests, such treatment should not obtain in
Ohio. Seisin jure uxoris was abolished in the jurisdiction by enactment
of the Married Woman's Property Acts. Recognition of the husband's
creditors would imply a superior interest of the husband in control of
the estate, parallel to jure uxoris, and as a matter of policy, generally
conflict with the equalization of property rights otherwise accomplish72
ed by the Married Woman's Property Acts.
In jurisdictions where the common law rule of creditor immunity
has been abrogated, the entirety estate is generally characterized as a
concurrent tenancy with an indefeasible right of survivorship.7 3 If
Ohio courts adopt the express survivorship approach to the section
5302.17 estate then, as in the abrogating states, the spouses will hold
separate conveyable interests subject to attachment by creditors. There
are two distinct views regarding the extent to which creditors may
reach interests in survivorship property.
First, some jurisdictions hold that, where the interest of each
spouse in the property is equal, neither spouse may interfere with the
other's interest by conveyance of an immediate right to possession.,,
70. See notes 17 & 22 and accompanying text supra. There is no authority to suggest that the wife's survivorship right in an entirety estate could be defeated, under any
characterization of the husband's control, through attachment by the husband's

creditors. Cf. 4 G. THOMPSON, supra note 9, at § 1790.
71. Licker v. Gluskin, 265 Mass. 403, 165 N.E. 613 (1929).
72. See note 27 supra. This is the implication of section 3103.07 of the Ohio
Revised Code, which provides that the fact of marriage will not alter the nature of the
ownership of property by either spouse. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3103.07 (Page 1972).
73. Magee, supra note 4, at 89.
74. The limitation on transfer of the possessory interest of a spouse has one
parallel in Ohio. In a case involving a joint and survivorship bank account held by a
husband and wife it was held that the account itself was not assignable by the husband,
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With respect to possession, then, the estate parallels the limited alienation character of the common law entirety. The survivorship interests
of the spouses, however, are separately considered. Because the
transfer of one spouse's right of survivorship does not interfere with
the other spouse's interest in present possession, the right is conveyable. Creditors can, therefore, attach the survivorship right of the
debtor spouse and, although they obtain no right to present possession, they obtain the whole property if the nondebtor predeceases the
debtor spouse. If the debtor dies first the creditor's attached interest is
ineffective."5
Under the second view of elimination of creditor immunity, all
identifiable individual interests in a cotenancy are conveyable by the
spouses, and attachable by their respective creditors, including the interest in present possession. In this respect, the underlying estate is certainly not in the entirety, and it has been held that upon attachment
the creditor becomes a tenant in common with the nondebtor
cotenant. Attachment bf the debtor's interests in the property includes
attachment of his survivorship right, with the creditor's exclusive right to
the whole property, again depending on the order of death of the
spouses.

76

The evident difference between the two views of attachable interests is in the conveyability of the interest in present possession. The
second view more closely parallels the character of ownership under
the express survivorship cotenancies recognized by Ohio courts. The
first view appears unsound in that it conceptually mixes an entirety
theory of present possession with a modern law view of survivorship.
If Ohio courts elect an express survivorship approach to the section
5302.17 estate, then they will have determined that the legislature did
not intend to authorize the common law theory of entirety ownership.
They may, therefore, be reluctant to apply entirety theory, even if only
with respect to the interest in present possession.
although the funds therein might have been withdrawn by him in toto and then given
to the intended assignee. Schwartz v. Sandusky County Sav. & Loan, 65 Ohio App.
437, 30 N.E.2d 556 (1939).
75. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Newell, 249 Ky. 270, 60 S.W.2d 607 (1932).
76. See, e.g., Franks v. Wood, 217 Ark. 10, 228 S.W.2d 480 (1950). The opportunity to collect current income from property obviously lies with the tenant in posses-

sion. Section 5307.21 of the Ohio Revised Code provides, however, that the income
obtained by a tenant in common in possession may be recovered by other cotenants
"according to the justice and equity of the case." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5307.21
(Page 1970). It has been held that this statute imposes a duty on the tenant in possession to account for rents and profits to the tenants out of possession. Lipps v. Lipps,
90 Ohio App. 578, 100 N.E.2d 862 (1951) (per curiam). A creditor attaching the

possessory interest of a tenant in or out of possession would thereby gain access only
to that tenant's share of income from the property.
Published by eCommons, 1979

UNIVERSITY OF DA YTON LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 4:2

A mechanics lien, resulting from construction authorized by one
spouse, is generally permitted only where attachment by one spouse's
individual creditors would be allowed." Under either alternative
characterization of the section 5302.17 estate, however, a lien may also
be imposed against both spouse's interests in the property where the
nonauthorizing spouse benefits from necessary repair to the property,
or consents expressly or impliedly to the other spouse's authorization
of improvements.
A partitioning of entirety property, by one spouse or that spouse's
9
in
creditors, was not permitted at common law. The rule is retained
8" and
estate
entirety
law
those jurisdictions maintaining the common
should be adopted in Ohio under the first alternative characterization
of the section 5302.17 estate.
Partitions of joint tenancies and tenancies in common, however,
1
are generally available in equity. To the extent that the underlying
estate in Ohio express survivorship cotenancies is held by undivided
shares, as in joint tenancy and tenancy in common, it would appear
that the right of partition should be available under the second alternative characterization of the section 5302.17 estate. But the effect of
partition on the survivorship right under this approach is a conceptual
anomaly. In partition of joint tenancy, survivorship attending the
cotenancy is destroyed because of the destruction of necessary
unities. 2 In express suryivorship contenancies, however, the right of
survivorship is not dependent on necessary unities of the underlying
83
estate, but on the intention manifested in the instrument of creation.
In theory, therefore, the destruction of unities by partition should not
affect the intention of survivorship with respect to the whole property,
and the partitioned estate should be reunited in the survivor on the
death of the first spouse. Nonetheless, the partition of tenancy in common in Ohio has been said to locate all the rights of each contenant in
respective physical shares of the property.' Application of this principal to partitioned express survivorship estates would result in effective destruction of the survivorship right because each tenant after
77. See Magee, supra note 4, at 91; Baker, supra note 54, at 1671.
78. See Wilson v. Logue, 131 Ind. 191, 30 N.E. 1079 (1892) (implied consent of
spouse in common law entirety); Gleason v. Squires, 39 Ohio App. 88, 176 N.E. 593
(1931) (stating Ohio rule that one tenant in common cannot bind contenants except for
necessary items).
79. C. SMITH & R. BOYER, supra note 11, at 62.
80. See, e.g., Hoag v. Hoag, 213 Mass. 50, 99 N.E. 521 (1912).
81. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 6.19-.26 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
82. See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
83. Lewis v. Baldwin, 11 Ohio 352 (1842).
84. Tabler v. Wiseman, 2 Ohio St. 207, 211 (1853).
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partition would maintain the right only in his physical share of the property.
C. Divorce.
Divorce dissolves the limiting marital relationship required by
statute for the section 5302.17 estate. It does not, however, invalidate
the title, concurrent tenancy, or intended survivorship manifested by
the prescribed deed. These same characteristics have been judicially
recognized and operative in Ohio in other express survivorship
estates. 5 Therefore, under the express survivorship characterization of
the section 5302.17 estate, divorce will merely, in theory, remove the
tenancy from the ambit of the statutory provision and should have no
other effect on its recognition and operation.
The majority of jurisdictions recognizing common law entirety
estates have adopted the view that termination of a marriage terminates the requisite unity of person. Hence, the entirety estate, where
joint tenancy is not recognized, converts to tenancy in common., 6 The
theoretical consistency of this view has been thought to obscure a
latent flaw: if a spouse may not effectively convey an interest in an entirety state-because to do so would destroy the estate by destroying
the unities of time and title and thereby destroy the other spouse's interest in the whole-then the same spouse should not be able to obtain
a conveyable tenancy in common interest through destruction of the
unity of person by precipitating divorce. This argument has been accepted in at least one jurisdiction where fault in divorce is recognized. 7
The argument, however, is incorrect. Conveyance of an entirety interest is ineffective for two reasons. First, a sole spouse has no undivided interest; the conveyance is ineffective because the sole spouse
has nothing to convey. Second, the conveyance is also ineffective, not
because it has destroyed requisite unities, but because if given effect it
will prospectively destroy them. The difference in divorce is that the
unity of person has been destroyed, thus giving rise to the tenancy in
common.8 Logical application of the argument against permitting one
spouse to convey a separate interest should not result in continuing the
85. See Lewis v. Baldwin, 11 Ohio 352 (1842).
86. See, e.g., Youree v. Youree, 217 Tenn. 53, 394 S.W.2d 869 (1965); Hillery v.
Hillery, 342 Mass. 371, 173 N.E.2d 269 (1961).
87. In re Lewis, 85 Mich. 340, 48 N.W. 580 (1891).
88. This change creates a problem parallel to the treatment of proceeds from the
joint sale of an entirety estate. See note 62 supra. Characterization of the estate after
divorce as a tenancy in common does not dispose of the survivorship right. To the extent that the statutory deed expressly manifests an intent of survivorship, survivorship
should be presumed to be a characteristic of the resulting tenancy in common.
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entirety interest after divorce, but should result in holding the divorce
ineffective because it is the event that prospectively destroys the requisite unity of person.
D.

Characteristicsat Death.

The nature of a concurrent tenancy has immediate consequences
upon the death of a cotenant. In some of these areas, however, the
alternative characterizations of the section 5302.17 estate will not vary
the consequences.
First, recordation of the cotenant's death is not mandatory to
perfect the survivor's title. Under entirety theory, the survivor's title is
perfect from the time of the original grant and is not changed by the
tenant's death.8 9 It therefore follows that the recordation of death will
not enhance the survivor's title. With respect to the express survivorship estates already recognized in Ohio, it has been suggested that
recordation be accomplished to constitute "sufficient proof of . . .
9
death" 90 ; but the cases indicate that valid title vests upon death " and
not upon recordation. In either event, the terms of section 5302.17
recognize title in the survivor upon the death of the cotenant and only
provide for permissive recordation after the "estate by the entireties
vests in a surviving spouse." 9 2
Second, section 5302.17 property is probably not subject to probate. The express survivorship estate already recognized in Ohio has
been considered to vest title in the survivor by the operative words of
the instrument of creation,93 and thereby leave no interest of the dece94
dent for administration or satisfaction of his debts. Moreover, in
89. Palmer v. Treasurer, 222 Mass. 263, 110 N.E. 283 (1915).
90. OHIO STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, OHIO STANDARDS OF TITLE EXAMINATION
§ 3.4 (1952), reprinted in 52 OHIO B. 77, 84 (1979).
91. Ross v. Bowman, 32 Ohio Op. 27, 28 (C.P. Hamilton County 1945).
92. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5302.17 (Page Supp. 1978). But cf. MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 565.48 (1967) (requires recorded certification of cotenant's death before
recordation of any conveyance by a survivor in former joint or entirety property).
93. Lewis v. Baldwin, 11 Ohio 352 (1842).
94. H. DEIBEL, PROBATE LAW § 253 (1954). See, e.g., Ross v. Bowman, 32 Ohio
App. at 28. In Sheard, Avoiding Probate of Decedents' Estates, 36 U. CIN. L. REV.
70, 80 (1967), the viability of joint and survivorship bank accounts as a probate
avoidance device in Ohio is questioned in view of the decision in Fecteau v. Cleveland
Trust Co., 171 Ohio St. 121, 167 N.E.2d 890 (1960) (bank signature card not conclusive as to ownership). The similarity between these accounts and express survivorship cotenancies is sufficiently close to bring the probate avoidance potential of the latter into question. The author correctly points out, however, that the mechanics of
signature cards are such that they do not necessarily reflect true owners of the account
or intended survivors. In express survivorship cotenancies, the beneficiary of survivorship is necessarily designated in the granting instrument.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol4/iss2/11

1979]

COMMENTS

common law entirety theory, the interest of the decedent is clearly extinguished upon death and there is no estate or interest upon which a
will can take effect. The common law entirety estate has, therefore,
generally been considered to be a "convenient mode of protecting a
surviving spouse from inconvenient administration of the decedent's
estate and from the other's improvident debts.""
In taxation of the decedent's estate and survivorship in simultaneous death, the alternative characterizations of the section 5302.17
estate present different problems. Although federal estate taxation has
been structured to prevent tax avoidance by variation of the character
of a cotenancy, 9 6 Ohio estate tax law does not provide such a gloss.
Section 5731.10 of the Ohio Revised Code9 7 provides for estate taxation of property held jointly at the time of death provided that the survivor obtains the right of possession of the whole property upon the
other's death. As anticipated, Ohio taxing authorities have indicated
that property held under section 5302.17 will be treated as jointly held
property subject to section 5731.10 taxation. 9 This treatment is appropriate if Ohio courts take the express survivorship view of the section
5302.17 estate because the survivor does obtain the possessory right in
the whole upon the other's death. 99 If the estate is considered to be one
in the entirety, however, the survivor does not obtain possession upon
the spouse's death, but merely continues in ownership and possession
of the whole by virtue of the original grant.' 0 0 Therefore, the terms of
section 5731.10 do not provide authority for inclusion of entireties
property in a decedent's estate and the anticipated treatment by taxing
authorities would be inappropriate.
While title by survivorship is a mechanical process in most situations, the simplicity of its application can present problems when the
G. THOMPSON, LAW OF WILLS § 7 (3d ed. 1947).
96. I.R.C. § 2040.
97. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5731.10 (Page 1973).
98. [Current Service] 1 OHIO TAx L. & RULES (BALDWIN) 146 (1977).
99. In [1922] Op. ATT'Y GEN. 1001 (Ohio), it was held that in express survivorship
the survivor acquired an estate in fee simple whereas each cotenant had previously
owned only undivided one-half interests for their joint lives with a contingent remainder to the survivor. Survivorsip would therefore not be a taxable succession
because the survivor did not succeed to anything previously owned by the decedent.
This position was reversed, in (1941] Op. ATT'v GEN. 164 (Ohio), by construing the
statutory designation of jointly held property to include all cotenancies irrespective of
the existence of survivorship.
100. PalmerV. Treasurer, 222 Mass. 263, 110 N.E. 283 (1915). The 1941 opinion
of the Ohio Attorney General, see note 99 supra, suggested that if joint and entirety
tenancies existed in the state then such estates would be taxed upon survivorship
because they are jointly held property under the statute. This view ignores the statutory
95.

requiremi.at for accrual of property interests by the survivor upon the cotenant's
death.
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cotenants die simultaneously. Section 3 of the Uniform Simultaneous
Death Act provides for the distribution of entirety estates, when the
tenant spouses die simultaneously, "one-half as if one had survived
and one-half as if the other had survived."'"' The act has not been
adopted in Ohio. Instead, section 2105.21 of the Ohio Revised Code
provides only a presumption on the order of death so that "no one of
such persons shall be presumed to have died first and the estate of each
shall pass and descend as though he had survived the others.'"" This
section is not amenable to estates by the entirety because the distribution can vary with the spouse first considered. If the Ohio courts adopt
the entirety approach to the section 5302.17 estate, then they should
°3
also adopt the logic of McGhee v. Henry' in solving the dilemma.
The Tennessee Supreme Court there decided, in considering circumstances under a similar statutory vacuum, that the entirety estate converts to tenancy in common upon simultaneous death. The court
reasoned that death, like divorce, destroys the requisite unity of person, and where joint tenancy is not recognized, a tenancy in common
must result. Because this approach would convert the entirety estate
into shares for distribution under section 2105.21, the result is similar
to that reached under the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act.
If Ohio courts adopt the express survivorship characterization of
the section 5302.17 estate, then the conversion logic of McGhee need
not be employed. Upon simultaneous death, intended survivorship is
impossible as in McGhee. The underlying estate, however, is not held
by the entirety, but by moieties. The distribution of moieties under sec04
tion 2105.21 does not vary with the spouse first considered.'
UNIFORM SIMULTANEOUS DEATH ACT § 3.
102. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.21 (Page 1976).
103. 144 Tenn. 548, 234 S.W. 509 (1921).
104. The presumption of the existence of moieties or undivided one-half shares in
express survivorship cotenancies was recognized in Lewis v. Baldwin, 11 Ohio 352
(1842), and In re Hutchison, 120 Ohio St. 542, 166 N.E. 687 (1929). The problem,
however, is whether the impossibility of determining survivorship is sufficient reason
to ignore it and proceed directly to section 2105.21 distribution. In White, Notes on
Survivorship Deeds-So-Called, 24 Ohio Op. 119 (1943), the author concluded that
survivorship under deed should not be ignored simply because of difficulty in determining who survived: "Now if a [survivorship] deed is valid when made, nothing that
happens thereafter will affect its validity." Id. at 120. In addressing the ultimate question of distribution (under the predecessor to section 2105.21) the author provides a
less than clear answer:
But someone says "What would a court do if it were impossible to determine
which died first?" Well, after all, that is a question for the court to puzzle over.
That is not my problem-it is a problem for the court. My hunch is that the court
might take the bull by the horns and divide the property equally among the heirs
of the victims of the common accident.
It is practically impossible for two persons to die at the same hour, minute and
101.
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CONCLUSION

It has been suggested that section 5302.17 be extensively revised by
amendment or repealed altogether. ' Common law entirety theory is
thought, at best, to be an anachronistic regression to a system of holding land inconsistent with current theories on the ownership of property."0 6 On the other hand, the estate may be considered beneficial in
protecting a family from the creditors of an improvident spouse."7
Nonetheless, the Ohio statute is particularly considered to be an act of
legislative improvidence because of its ambiguous language.
Despite the difficulties perceived in the section 5302.17 estate there
has been no legislative attempt at meaningful reform or repeal in the
seven years since its enactment.'" 8 Ohio courts are therefore left to deal
with the law as they find it. As they construe the statute in litigation, it
is imperative that they arrive at a consistent characterization of the
estate, whether it be an express survivorship or entirety tenancy, in
second. One of the two was the survivor and the survivor takes the property by
the terms of the deed. The question as to which one survived is a question for the
court. Difficult? Sure. But the courts have to settle a lot of difficult questions.
Id. In Barsch, Survivorship Deeds (address before the Real Estate Section of the Ohio
Bar, May 13, 1949, reprinted in 22 OHIO B. 184 (1949)), the author made no mention
of mandatory factfinding in lieu of the statutory presumption on the order of death,
but did accept Mr. White's "hunch." In view of the presumption of moieties in survivorship cotenancies, however, equal division between the decedents' estates seems
more tenable than equal division among heirs. Cf. In re Markiewitz, 129 N.E.2d 328
(P. Ct. Ohio 1955) (survivorship in joint bank account failed because of the manner of
death, and there was equal division between the spouses' estates).
105. See Magee, supra note 4, at 83, 84, 86-88.
106. It has been suggested that entirety theory is antithetical to the women's rights
movement. 2 T. MCDERMOTT, supra note 5. Since the rights of spouses ill entirety
properties have been equalized in most jurisdictions, see note 28 and accompanying
text supra, it is difficult to understand why this conclusion is drawn. As a matter of
policy, it should be noted that the entirety estate is consistent with concepts of fostering family ownership and the enduring marriage. It may be, however, that the entirety
estate is thought to portend a return of the seisin jure uxoris, see note 22 supra; or it
may be simply that the attachment of a greater significance to marriage, in the ownership of property, is somehow not as acceptable to the supporters of women's rights as
it may be to others.
107. See note 94 and accompanying text supra.
108. The statutory deed form has been subject to some use by Ohio practitioners.
See Magee, supra note 4, at 93. It appears, therefore, that repeal of the statute or
clarification of legislative intent by amendment should not be attempted unless existing
titles created under section 5302.17 are reasonably accommodated. Any repeal or
amendment at this point in time that is only prospective may create a trap for the unwary attorney by establishing an anomalous seven year period, during which the estate
by the entireties was recognized, and which must be separately considered during
future title searches. On the other hand, simple retroactive repeal will produce a
negative result in that the status of outstanding section 5302.17 estates will not be certain. [NOTE: S.B. 173, which "defines the characteristics of . . . an estate by the entireties," was introduced in the Ohio Senate on April 18, 1979. BULLETIN, 113th
General Assembly
1979-1980
(May 30, 1979, p. 38).]
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order to resolve problems arising under the section in a consistent manner.
If the estate is approached as one in the entirety, then the courts
will have to explore unfamiliar areas of common and modern law in
developing guidelines for its treatment. If the estate is treated as one of
express survivorship, however, there will be little need for judicial
enlargement of the Ohio law of concurrent tenancies. The characteristics of the estate have been developed in the express survivorship
estates heretofore recognized in the jurisdiction, and the section itself
essentially serves to provide nothing more than a limited statutory survivorship deed form. The ready interface between this view of the
statutory estate and the express survivorship estate appears to suggest
that it would be the more prudent option for selection by Ohio courts.
The alternative entirety identification of section 5302.17 will produce
unnecessary uncertainty, if only because of the inconsistencies between
10 9
the statutory language and common law theory, until the characteristics of the estate are defined by adjudication of successive controversies in Ohio courts.
Paul Gerard Hallinan
109.

See notes 38-47 and accompanying text supra.
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